Between Kanye and Elon Musk breaking the internet, the SBF interviews and a right Royal drama unfolding at the palace, you’d be forgiven for not noticing that one of the more important gatherings of international experts and state signatories of the year has been taking place in Geneva, Switzerland under the auspices of the United Nations.
Goings-on there have been utterly fascinating and equal in controversy and disinformation claims to any of the above. And yet, nobody in the mainstream seems to be reporting on them.
We are, of course, talking about the 9th BWC Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). The meeting, which was originally supposed to happen in 2021 but was postponed because of Covid, began on Monday November 28 and continues on until December 16.
I reported on the last inter-sessional gathering when it occurred in August 2021 while still at the Financial Times. At the time the main controversy stalking the meeting was the issue of Covid’s origins. Bioweapons experts like King’s College London’s Filippa Lentzos, however, warned that even if the issue was front and centre of participants’ minds, diplomatic sensitivities would ensure scant reference to the “lab-leak theory” during formal proceedings.
At this year’s review meeting, however, diplomacy seems to have gone out of the window. All pretences have been abandoned. The topic driving everyone crazy, however, isn’t continuing uncertainty about Covid’s origins and potential linkage to gain-of-function technology. It’s Russia’s ongoing insistence that US-funded biolabs in Ukraine have been engaged in potentially treaty-violating dual-use activity, something both the United States and Ukraine deny and claim is strategic disinformation from the Russian side.
Veteran meeting watcher Richard Guthrie of CBW Events has been tracking events as he always does. As his report of the second day’s proceedings noted (our emphasis):
The statement by Ukraine included comments on the military situation there. Four points of order were raised by Russia during this statement, each time with the claim that issues being raised were outside of the remit of the BWC. In response, each time, the President of the Review Conference, Ambassador Leonardo Bencini of Italy, ruled that he wanted to give delegates some flexibility and allow them to develop their arguments to show why what they were raising was relevant to the BWC. At the end of the national statements, the USA used its right of reply to highlight that senior Russian political figures had made remarks claiming to justify the military action because of supposed evidence of components of biological weapons being made in Ukraine. This, the US argued, meant the invasion was relevant to the BWC. In reply, Russia argued that the West was trying to avoid awkward questions about military-sponsored research in Ukraine.The statements by international bodies ran smoothly until NATO spoke of Russian disinformation in relation to Ukraine. Russia raised points of order claiming the rules of procedure did not allow for oral statements from observer organizations. In view of the late hour, the President suggested suspending the meeting to return to this question in the morning. The NATO statement was thus partially presented.
You can listen to the full recorded sessions here.
On Thursday, however, things got even more heated.
The gist of proceedings followed in a similar vein with Russia reasserting its claims that Ukraine was in breach of Article I of the convention. But Russian representatives also went on to argue that it was time to apply greater verification and cross-inspection powers to the convention.
Russia’s full statement and version of events can be read here.
America, Ukraine, Britain, Canada and Australia have largely defended the conclusions of the consultative committee meeting, which occurred in September 2022 on Russia’s request, and concluded that the current system focused on confidence-building measures was sufficient. But even they are now edging towards supporting a more formal verification mechanism to add trust. It’s a big development. Especially for the US.
The BWC is distinct from other international weapons conventions, such as those governing chemical and nuclear use, because it has always lacked any formal mechanism for enforcing verification and inspection of biological research.
Andy Weber, assistant secretary of defense for nuclear, chemical and biological defence programmes under President Barack Obama, previously told me: “There was an effort in the late 1990s, early 2000s, to add a verification provision based on the success of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which has very good verification and inspection capabilities . . . but that was blocked, mostly by the United States.”
At issue for the US was the fact that when mutual inspections between Russia, Britain and the United States took place in the 1990s – led among others on the UK side by the late David Kelly – the Russian side had insisted on visiting the private facilities of Pfizer. Pfizer conceded to the inspection following pressure from Bill Clinton to do so, but was appalled in the aftermath of the visit by Russia’s twisted account of what they had seen there. The US has since bowed to commercial considerations on the matter of inspections.
Members continue to be divided about how best to apply verification protocols. But the build-up of ever more grandiose claims from Russia is finally exposing the weaknesses of a system that lacks any protocol without verification or inspection.
Among the explosive allegations in Russia’s statement were the following (my emphasis):
In addition, on March 9, 2022, on the territory of the Kherson region, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation discovered three unmanned aerial vehicles equipped with 30–liter containers and equipment which can be used to spray bioagents. In late April 2022, 10 more of the same were found in the area of Kakhovka. These facts are of particular importance considering a confirmed request from the Ukrainian side to the Bayraktar UAV manufacturer about the maximum payload of Bayraktar Akinci UAVs (flight range up to 300 km) and the ability to equip it with an aerosol generating system with a 20+ liters capacity.
The information obtained from various sources reaffirm the leading role of Pentagon’s Threat Reduction Agency (TRA), as well as other American private companies that are regular contractors of the US military, including
Black & Veatch Special Projects Corp., CH2M Hill, Metabiota, in funding the military and biological activity in Ukraine.
Such assessments are additionally confirmed by the analytical reports of the Kherson Department of the Security Service of Ukraine dated 30 June 2016 and 28 February 2017. It is indicated therein that the DTRA programs implemented through Black & Veatch Special Projects Corp. were intended to establish control over the functioning of microbiological laboratories in Ukraine conducting research on pathogens of infectious diseases that can be used to create or modernize biological weapons.
Canada, Australia and Ukraine continue to insist all of the above is strategic Russian “disinformation”.
Ukraine’s own statement went even further by suggesting the purpose of Russian biological weapons disinfo may be to mask a potential Russian “false flag” operation of its own (my emphasis):
I would like to thank all delegations who called the Russian bluff about non–existing biological weapons laboratories in Ukraine. Indeed, these allegations were rejected by the overwhelming majority of States that participated in the Formal Consultative Meeting held under BWC Article V in September. Later the same allegations were rejected by the UN Security Council. Ukraine agrees with a need to work out effective measures in order to prevent abuses of the mechanism of summoning of formal consultative meetings under the Article V of the Convention.
However, we have very serious reasons to be worried about the real Russian goals behind these false allegations. Russia proved to be very unscrupulous in its criminal methods. From our experience of dealing with Russia, when they accuse their neighbors of some wrongdoings, it is almost certain that they are preparing the grounds for some very serious provocations. In this case, it could be provocations with the use of biological materiel under a “false flag”.
This is why the international community has to be vigilant and well prepared. We all know that Russia inherited from the Soviet Union a lot of bio-medical research and development facilities, which were used to develop the biological weapons. However, we know nothing about whether these facilities are not used for the purposes inconsistent with the provisions of the Biological Weapons Convention. We also know nothing about the situation with the biomedical facilities on the territory of Ukraine, temporarily occupied by Russia, including in Crimea.
Therefore, we request Russia to provide full and unconditional access to all these facilities for international inspections for the purposes of verification of compliance.
At the same time, I would also like to express hope that our Review Conference could consider alternative measures to this effect in case Russia quite predictably refuses to cooperate on these serious matters.
If a Russian rocket destroys one of our medical facilities that uses vaccines or explores pathogens,or if such a facility is affected by long–term energy blackouts, the consequences can be very dangerous for the people and the environment. On the other hand, the constant Russian shelling is also leading to disintegration of cattle burial sites and increasing the risks of circulation of dangerous pathogens and outbreaks of infectious diseases.
It is unjustifiable that 50 years after its approval, the Convention continues to lack a mechanism to verify compliance.
We do not agree with those who affirm that the current geopolitical context does not allow strengthening the Convention by adopting said Protocol. On the contrary, its urgent need is clearer today than ever. The status quo is unacceptable and only benefits those whooppose the strengthening of the multilateral disarmament system.
The Verification Protocol negotiations cannot start from scratch, ignoring the significant progress achieved during 10 years of intense and serious work, interrupted abruptly and unilaterally by the United States in 2001, when the text of the Protocol was practically ready for formal adoption.
A large number of statements suggested that the BWC would be significantly strengthened if it had some form of compliance measures. Some statements highlighted the US withdrawal from the negotiations for a protocol that had been taking place in the Ad Hoc Group and called specifically for a return to the protocol negotiations. These were
consistent with similar statements made over the years. But there were many statements with a somewhat changed tone, including a number of Western states calling for formal compliance measures who had been much more muted in the past when they were aware the US would have opposed progress in this area. There were numerous expressions of support for the temporary expert working group proposal in the Canada/Netherlands
working paper. The US statement referred to the need for a better understanding of what was required for an effective understanding of compliance and, for the first time in many Review Conferences, used the term ‘verification measures’ in a positive context.
These are some of the most significant developments for the BWC in decades, a body that usually operates at a snail’s pace.
How a verification and inspection mechanism would work is far from decided. But some suggest the Kazakhstan-proposed International Agency for Biological Safety (IASB) could be a key part of the solution. Whether anything can be determined — and funded — in time to make a difference in the Russian/Ukraine war remains uncertain. But this is clearly the best chance yet for a Hans Blix-style delegation to determine the truth of what’s going on in Ukraine and Russia. And if it works in Ukraine and Russia, who knows, it might also work in China and elsewhere too.
Spotlight on Biosecurity: How ‘gain-of-function’ slipped through the net – The Blind Spot (March, 2022)
Further Reading/Notes
Comments from the Russian Federation
In that regard, on 26 August and 5th and 9th of September this year at the initiative of the Russian Federation we convened an official consultative meeting of States parties to the Convention under Article Five, regarding issues pertaining to compliance by Kiev and Washington with their commitments under the Convention in the context of the activities of biolaboratories in Ukrainian territory. Russia worked on the basis that a consultative meeting would allow interested delegations with the support of their experts to understand in full the situation, exchange opinions, views, ask professional questions and received detailed responses being the most important thing during the meeting. Russia took all necessary steps to present in detail the material and arguments so as to ensure that the consultative meeting could achieve its goals and settle the situation linked to the military bioilogical activities in Ukraine.
However, pursuant to the exchange of opinions between States parties, the Russian Federation noted that the vast majority of the questions put forward by it were not answered, as the outcome report of the consultative meeting states there was no consensus reached, they contained those questions remain outstanding and need to be settled. In that regard what is needed is further efforts in the forum of the Convention to resolve this situation. What we need are additional measures at least holding additional consultations in order to mitigate existing concerns and questions regarding the activities of the bio–labs in Ukraine.
Steps need to be taken to establish all facts connected to violations by Kiev and Washington of their commitments under the Convention. Until the questions we put are mitigated or addressed they will remain open on the platform of the Convention and will undermine its implementation. Russia attaches great importance to CBMs under the Convention. Since the introduction of CBMs of 1987, our country has participated annually in exchange of such information. What is more Russia announcements include additional information provided at our own initiative, which goes beyond just the CBM criteria stipulated. In the absence of an oversight mechanism whose development we support CBMs are the only agreed instrument for raising confidence in the transparency of activities linked to the Convention. Moreover we stress our conviction that they cannot be viewed as a substitute for a verification mechanism on implementation of commitments under the BWC or be a means for assessment of compliance with the BWC, by any state. Therefore Russia proposes complementing CBMs with a new formula: military medical biological activities carried out by States parties in the territory of other States. What is more, we think it is necessary to improve the formula for announcing facilities for production of vaccines by providing data on such facilities for producing vaccines for the protection of animals.
Such a working document has been represented for your consideration, you can study these texts on the BWC Internet Portal, I thank you, now I would like to give the floor to Cuba, followed by the United Kingdom.
Cuba
United Kingdom
Canada
Canada is pleased that Russia’s blatantly false narrative was soundly rejected at the article five consultations in September and that the invocation of Article six was rebuffed.
Ukraine
Mainly it is Article 4 and 5. The Ukrainian side is deeply pleased that the overwhelming majority of the delegations except few found our presentation fully informative, accurate and persuasive and our approach, transparent and constructive, allowing to even reinforce their convictions and our strict adherence to the BWC provisions, including its articles 1, 4 and 10, and the exclusively peaceful nature of our relevant cooperation with the United States and other international partners. We are glad that we have been heard by the BWC community.
I can say that for many in this room, it has become very obvious that the real purpose of the Russian Federation when in walk Article 5 of the Convention, namely to justify its full–scale war aggression against Ukraine, was to divert attention from the numerous military crimes being committed by it against the Ukrainian people, as well as from circumvention by itself of the provision of the Convention.
